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Abstract: This paper explored the determinants of survival in a life and death situation
created by an external and unpredictable shock. We are interested to see
whether pro-social behaviour matters in such extreme situations. We
therefore focus on the sinking of the RMS Titanic as a quasi-natural
experiment do provide behavioural evidence which is rare in such a
controlled and life threatening event.  The empirical results support that
social norm such as “women and children first” survive in such an
environment. We also observe that women of reproductive age have a higher
probability of surviving among women. On the other hand, we observe that
crew members used their information advantage and their better access to
resources (e.g. lifeboats) to generate a higher probability of surviving. The
paper also finds that passenger class, fitness, group size, and cultural
background matter.
JEL Classifications: D63; D64; D71; D81
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Excess of Demand
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2How selfish soever man be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he
derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Adam Smith 1969).
I. INTRODUCTION
At the very core of economics is the question of scarcity, or “how society makes
choices concerning the use of limited resources” (Stiglitz 2000, p. 14). To achieve
utility-maximization from the limited set of resources traditional economic models
assume that individuals are exclusively pursuing their material self-interest. The
assumption has shown to be useful in many cases. However, substantial evidence has
been generated that other motives such as, for example, altruism, fairness, or morality
affect the behaviour of many individuals. People sometimes punish others who have
harmed them or reward others who have helped them, sacrificing their own wealth
(Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin 2004). People donate blood or organs without
being paid for and donate money for charitable purposes. In wartime many
individuals volunteer and are willing to take high risks as soldiers (Elster 2007).
Citizens vote in elections incurring more private costs then benefits and people are
paying more taxes that a traditional economic-of-crime model would predict (Torgler
2007). Individuals also help others in many situations on the job (Drago and Garvey
1998). In many experiments subjects have been shown to care about aspects as
fairness, reciprocity, and distribution. Ultimatum experiments have shown that the
modal offer is (50,50), that the mean offer is somewhere around (40,60), and that the
smaller the offer, the higher the probability that the offer will be rejected (Ochs and
Roth 1989, Roth 1995). We also observe helping is a key element in our work
environment: “Within every work group in a factory, within any division in a
government bureau, or within any department of a university are countless acts of
cooperation without which the system would break down. We take these everyday
acts for granted, and few of them are included in the formal role prescriptions for any
job” (Katz and Kahn 1966, p. 339).
3Individuals compare themselves with their environment and care greatly about
their relative position, which influences individual choices. Thus, not only is the
absolute level of an individual’s situation important (e.g., income), but also the
relative position. Researchers have included the concept of interdependent preferences
to allow for social comparison (e.g., Becker 1974, Easterlin 1974, Scitovsky 1976,
Schelling 1978, Pollak 1976, Frank 1985, Clark, Frijters and Shields 2008, Akerlof
and Yellen 1990). Frank (1999) emphasizes that research provides “compelling
evidence that concern about relative position is a deep-rooted and ineradicable
element in human nature” (p. 145).
Thus, several approaches try to take into account the deviation of a self-
interested model extending the motivation structure (e.g. Becker 1974, Rabin 1993,
Andreoni and Miller 2002, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1999, Fehr and Schmidt
1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Sobel 2005, Frey 1997). In general, Thaler (2000)
stresses that the Homo Oeconomicus will evolve to Homo Sapiens: “As economists
become more sophisticated, their ability to incorporate the findings of other
disciplines such as psychology improves” (p. 140).
Despite the large amount of studies in this area there is hardly any empirical
evidence that allows seeing whether interdependent preferences and pro-social
behaviour matter in extreme situations such as life and death situation. This paper
tries to reduce this shortcoming by exploring this question using data from the sinking
of the RMS Titanic, the most recognizable maritime disaster in history. While the
precipitous loss of life from this tragedy was indeed sorrowful, the event provides us
with an opportunity to utilize the event data to better understand the decision making
process that is made under these extreme pressures. Individuals are forced to make
choices that affect their probability of surviving. What makes this event interesting for
research is that it is an enclosed and controlled event, much like a natural field
experiment, where the majority of exogenous factors are controlled and the
endogenous factors can be tested and investigated. The environmental or situational
conditions were identical for every person on board of the Titanic. This allow us to
explore behavioural reactions to such an external shock, as well as to investigate
people’s behaviour under scarcity. The issue of scarcity or shortage arose due to the
severe lack of lifeboats, the Titanic had only 20 designed to carry 1178 people and the
problem was further exacerbated by the panicked deck crew, who began launching
4life boats that were not at capacity. This meant an excess of demand situation in the
sense that people wishing to survive had to compete with others on board for a place.
A failure to secure a seat virtually guaranteed death, as the average water temperature
of the surrounding ocean was about 2 degree Celsius (35 Fahrenheit); any survivors of
the sinking vessel left in the water would quickly freeze to death. We can expect that
there is a certain level of agreement among those in the boat and probably those
others waiting for a lifeboat to limit the lifeboat to its maximum safe load to avoid
that the boat is in serious danger (Martin 1978). In addition, we can largely exclude
that a potential helping behaviour could be driven by future reciprocity, a key element
in the helping literature (e.g. Goulder 1960, Batson et al. 1979). A life and death
situation can be seen as a “one-shot game”. Moreover, previous research has shown
that legitimacy affects helping behaviour. Legitimate need elicits more help than does
illegitimate need (e.g., own laziness) (Schwartz and Flieshman 1978, Berkowitz
1969). In our case, people are confronted with an “external shock” which helps to
control in a substantial manner legitimacy.
Thus, the intention of the paper is to investigate the decisions made under
these extreme conditions and see if the survival outcomes fit with the literature on
interdependent preferences. The key question is whether we are able to observe social
norms, fairness and social preferences in a life or death situation.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Previous studies have explored the link between fairness and shortage using survey
data. Kahneman et al. (1986) have shown in telephone surveys of randomly selected
residents in two Canadian metropolitan areas that people consider the use of prices to
eliminate the excess of demand to be unfair. This is consistent with the observation
that firms do not change prices and wages as often as traditional economic theory
would suggest. Moreover, we also observe formal laws that penalize sellers who take
advantage of shortages through a price rise of water, fuel and other necessities after a
natural disaster (Cameron, Loewenstein, and Rabin 2004).  Frey and Pommerehne
(1993), Savage and Torgler (2008) replicated the study using European samples. They
found similar results. In a shortage situation an allocation process in line with
tradition (first come, first served) is perceived to be fairest, followed by
5administration allocation procedures. However, compared to these previous studies
we explore behavioural consequences of an excess of demand in a life and death
situation.
Our research focus is closely linked to the question whether we observe in line
with the traditional economic approach that people behave according to the notion
“every man for himself” or whether a “helping hand” effect is observable.
Interestingly, helping others is not uncommon. Perlow and Weeks (2002) stress that
helping behaviour is required within organizations for efficiency, flexibility, learning
and innovation: “Therefore, it has never been more important for us to understand
why people help each other at work- and why they don’t (p. 343). Shotland and
Stebbins (1983) refer to two lines of thoughts, an “altruism school” with the premise
that people have a need (innate or acquired) to help others in need or a hedonistic base
that suggests that people weigh the impact of benefits and costs to themselves to reach
the decision to help or not (p. 36). The second one is close to a traditional economic
approach.
Helping behaviour is not only linked to altruism (Piliavin and Charng 1990),
but also reciprocity or exchange (Oberholzer-Gee 2007, Fehr et al 2002, Henrich
2004). The idea of reciprocity is to help those who have helped us. Exchange not only
focuses on direct reciprocity but also on expectations that leads to solidarity and
indirect reciprocity in more anonymous settings such as helping lost tourists
(Rabinowitz et al. 1997). However, as discussed in the introduction, we are able to
exclude as well as possible such a motivation due to the source of our data set.
Altruistic motivation has been defined as the desire or the motivation to
enhance as the ultimate goal the welfare of others even at a net welfare loss to oneself
(Batson 1992, Elster 1997) and an altruistic act as “an action for which an altruistic
motivation provides a sufficient reason” (Elster 1997, p. 95). However, altruistic
behaviour is often framed as being somewhat egoistic. It is stressed that what appears
to be motivated by a concern for someone is often ultimately driven by selfish
motives (Piliavin and Charng 1990). The differentiation between motivation and act is
useful as identifying altruistic motivation is problematic. For example, we observe a
“warm glow effect” if people like to give someone else something because it makes
them feel good. Piliavin and Charng (1990) summarizing the literature refers to a
“paradigm shift” that acknowledges the strength of altruism: “The central point we
6attempt to make in this review is that the data from sociology, economics, political
science, and social psychology are all at least compatible with the position that
altruism is part of human nature. People do have “other regarding sentiments”, they
do contribute to public goods from which they benefit little, they do sacrifice for their
children and even for others to whom they are not related” (p. 29).
If people sacrifice their life or if they increase the fitness or the survival
possibility of others in the Titantic disaster at the expense of their own survival, we
can observe altruistic behaviour. Self-sacrificing can be seen as an extreme form of
altruism. Krebs (1991), e.g., stresses: “On my definition of altruism, behaviors
directed toward the enhancement of the welfare of another increase in altruism in
proportion to the anticipated costs to self: Risking your life to save a drowning person
is more altruistic than throwing him or her a lifesaver” (p. 137). A person could have
done better for herself not helping others and therefore ignoring the effects of her
choice on others (Margolis 1982). Such a notion is consistent with the social biology
definition of altruism (Wilson 1975).
There are various approaches to model altruistic behaviour. An altruistic
individual i would have the following function:
Ui = Ui (si, sj), (1)
where si, sj measure the survival probability of i and other individuals j. If i was an
egoist the utility function only depends on his own survival. This can be modeled
using the following specific utility function:
j
ij
ijii sssU ∑
≠
+= λ)( (2)
ijλ  is a factor that shows how much individual i cares about j.  If i doesn’t care at all,
i’s utility only depends on the own survival. A positive ijλ  reflects altruism. The
utility of i increases when individual j survives. On the other hand, a negative ijλ
reflects spite (Sobel 2005). The utility of i decreases if individual j has a higher
7probability of surviving. The degree of ijλ  depends on the level closeness between i
and j. Higher positive values are expected for family members and friends.
Moral values and personal norms are implicated in altruism (Piliavin and
Charng 1990). Altruistic motivation may be driven by moral norms such as helping
other in distress or sharing equally (Elster 2006). Norms are the generally accepted
conditions under which society functions guiding how individuals act and behave
towards each other, adopted and enforced by members of that society and not always
in the best interest of any particular individual with in that society (Elster 1985).
Elster (2007) sees moral norms as unconditional while social norms are conditional
and therefore influence by the presence or the behaviour of other people (p. 104.). A
key norm that we are going to explore is “women and children first”. Interestingly,
there is no international maritime law that requires that women and children are first
rescued. Such a social norm was first documented during the sinking of HMS
Birkenhead in 1852. The Birkenhead sank only twenty-five minutes after having
struck the rocks. The seven women and thirteen children were rowed away from the
wreck to safety. The Captain Seton drew his sword ordering men to “Stand an’ be
still” (Kipling 1892) to avoid that men rushed to the lifeboats putting the life of
women and children in danger. Similar norms can be found in other areas where
people are evacuated. Humanitarian agencies are often evacuating “vulnerable” and
“innocent” civilians such as women, children and elderly person first. The Geneva
Convention provides special protection and evacuation priority for pregnant women
and mothers of young children (Carpenter 2003).
How can we explain that such a social norm may arise? Helping children
provides the possibility of guaranteeing future generations and women provided at
that time the key role of caregivers. Thus, this may justify why women were also
considered to be rescued. We observe behavioural evidence that is consistent with the
norm of social responsibility. For example, studies report that motorists are more
willing to stop on a busy street for a woman who was pushing a baby carriage than
pushing a grocery cart (Harrell 1994). Helping behaviour is also visible in common
threat situations (Batson et al. 1979). We may observe in general a higher level of
helping behaviour due to the situation of a common threat that may generate a “we-
feelings” and as a consequence a concern for the welfare of others (Worman 1979). In
8other words closeness is strongly correlated with helping behaviour (Amato 1990) and
being involved together in external shock may induce closeness.
Eagly and Crowley (1986, p. 301) report in their meta-study that chivalrous
and heroic acts supported by the male gender role matters. The results indicate that
men are more-helpful than women if women perceive helping behaviour as more
dangerous than men, the audience witnesses the helping act and other potential
helpers were available which was not robust in the multivariate analysis. Moreover,
women receive more help than men and males believed themselves more competent
and more comfortable in helping than females. This would suggest that we observe a
higher probability of survival among females.
In addition, sociobiology also stresses the relevance of the “procreation
instinct”. The survival of a species relies on its progeny then a high value must be
placed upon females of reproductive age as a valuable resource. Social norms may be
created to protect the reproductive and child-rearing role of women. It is an attempt to
protect children rather than a result from a greater value to women’s life. A potential
shortage of women would limit the number of offsprings, while a shortage of men
would not (Felson 2000).
In humans the period of peak reproduction is between the ages of 15 and 35
(A.S.R.M. 2003), prior to 15 on average females are not reproductively functional and
after the age of 35 begins the slowing of the reproductive cycle until at about 50 the
reproductive function is lost. Others also stress that the social norm emergence of
helping women may be related to a stronger physical and structural vulnerability
women (Felson 2000).
Females may also have a strong incentive to guarantee the survival of their
kids in a Titanic event. In the study of anthropology “parental investment” is an
important concept. It argues that females of most species invest more in the survival
of their offspring that does the males. Females invest a range of benefits over a period
of time for the offspring from the gestation period, lactation, predatory protection and
education (Geary 1998) where as the males investment is much smaller. It is because
of this much larger investment by the females that the opportunity cost of losing
offspring is much higher as is the drive to ensure offspring survival is much stronger
(Campbell 1999). It has been shown that the mortality rates of children with a
9surviving mother are 1.4 times higher than those without (Voland 1998), and that the
survival rates of offspring can be directly linked to maternal survival (Bjorklund and
Shackelford 1999). Under these conditions it would be expected that females with
children would be much more wary of possible danger and would aggressively fight
other females to ensure a safe haven (Cashdan 1997).  Moreover, it has been stressed
that the sex that puts in greater parental investment to promote the survival of
offspring, is the more valued resource (Trivers 1972, Eswaran and Kotwal 2004).
We have discussed in the introduction several cases where we observe
altruistic behaviour among human beings. Interestingly, altruistic behaviour is also
reported among animals (Wilson 1975, pp. 121-129). Many examples can be observed
among social insects. For example, the solider caste of most species of termites and
ants place themselves in maximum danger positions and use alarm communication
that is closely coupled with suicidal attack behaviour. Bees and wasps have a high
readiness to give their lives away upon slight provocation to defend relatives. Adult
mooses, zebras, or kudus interpose themselves between predators and the young.
Adélie penguins help defend nests belonging to others against the attacks of skuas.
Birds use the instrument of distracting the enemy to draw it away from the protected
animal (e.g. eggs or young) (Montgomerie and Weatherhead 1988). We also observe
the reduction of personal reproduction in order to favour the reproduction of others.
For example, food sharing can be found in many situations (e.g. among social insects
where self-sacrificing is observable).
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Amato (1990) criticizes that a large amount of literature in this area of helping is
laboratory-based: “Researchers who value the rigor of the laboratory have been
reluctant to extend the study of prosocial behaviour to everyday life, where the
possibility of control is minimal” (p. 31). Working with the Titanic data provides an
alternative strategy to explore whether “social norms of helping” survive in a real life
and death situation. We cannot observe the detailed rescue process. However, we can
evaluate the overall outcome which provides an indication about the level of social
norms or altruism among the crew and the passengers.
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The dependant variable in this empirical model is a dummy that indicates
whether an individual survived the disaster or not (survived = 1), as earlier mentioned
individuals will modelled in an economic survival function iii XS εβα ++= that is
estimated using probit models. We are also calculating the marginal effects due to the
non-linear form of the probit model to be able report and discuss in detail the
quantitative effects. Our gender variable (female=1) will be a key factor that we will
explore. We predict that the coefficient is statistically significant with a positive sign.
In addition, we will observe whether children, women with children have a higher
probability to survive. To measure the age range of a child we use the United Nations
provisional guidelines of standard international age classifications (United Nations
1984). The guidelines classify children as being up to the age of 15.  Moreover, to
develop further age dummies we rely on an age notion that the British royal
commission used in 1870-4 and which appeared in a subsequent Act in 1875 in
regards to age benefits. The transition into “Old age” was defined to begin at 50
(Arias 2004, Boyer 1988, Eysenck 2004, Gorsky 1998). We will also explore whether
females in their reproductive age are more likely to survive compared to other
women. Moreover, we will check whether individuals or females with a larger
potential pool of helpers (family members) have a higher probability of surviving.
In addition to control for gender, age and family or travel group size1, we also
explore the following independent variables: passenger-class, crew member, and
nationality. The data was generated from numerous sources considering in particular
the Encyclopaedia Titanica. Passengers were separated into three different classes,
namely: first class, second class and third class. It can be expected that first class
passengers tried to obtain preferential treatment. A higher level (bargaining) power,
better access to information about imminent danger, persons of power and decision
makers such as leading crew members may lead to a higher probability of surviving
being able to get a better access to lifeboats. Moreover, first class cabins were closest
to the boat deck. We control for nationality as previous studies on helping behaviour
report cultural differences (Perlow and Weeks 2002). Moreover, it is usual to explore
differences between the crew and the passengers. Crew members are better prepared
for a catastrophic event and are also in the position of obtaining the information
                                                 
1 singles, singles with kids, singles with servants, couples, couples with kids, couples with servants,
families/friends, families/friends with kids and families/friends with servants. The families/friends
groups include extended family groups and groups of friends travelling together as a party.
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earlier than the passengers. They could use this information advantage to generate a
higher survival rate. They have also better access to important resources such as
lifeboats. On the other hand, they are restricted by the expectation to be among the
very last to leave the sinking ship.
Table 1 presents the empirical results for the first set of estimations. We begin
by first examining if there is an expected gender effect. In the first four specifications
we only include the coefficient FEMALE in the specification, focusing on all the
individuals on board of the Titanic (see specification 1), only passengers (2), crew
members (3), and couples (4). The results indicate that there is a strong gender effect.
Being female rather than male increases the probability of surviving between 23.7
(specification 3) and 53.9 percentage points (specification 4). This is quite a
substantial quantitative effect. Interestingly, females have a lower probability to
survive among crew member than among passengers. Moreover, we observe that the
survival rate of females increase when focusing only on couples. In sum, the gender
effect remains robust in all the 11 regression that we present in Table 1. The effect
even increases after controlling for further factors (see specification 5 to 11).
In a next step we are interested in exploring whether children have also a
higher probability of surviving. In specification (5) we focus only on passengers
controlling for passenger class, using the age dummies AGE Sub 15 (age 15 and
below), AGE 16-50 and AGE 51+ (reference group) to explore the age-survival
relationship. The results support the notion that children have a higher probability of
surviving than other age groups reporting the largest marginal effects. Being a child
rather than a person AGE 51+ (reference group) increases the probability of surviving
by 32 percentage points. Moreover, the coefficient AGE 16-50 is also statistically
significant. Thus, we find a negative relationship between age and survival
probability.
Specification (5) and the following ones in Table 1 also show that first and
second class passengers have a higher probability of surviving. Being in the first class
as opposed to third class (which is the reference group) increases the probability of
surviving by around 40 percentage points. Thus, more (bargaining) power, better
access to information and lifeboats increases the probability of surviving quite
substantially.
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In specification (6) we work with the entire data set using a CREW dummy
variable. The results show that crew members do take advantage of having more
possibilities to acquire resources and having a higher level of information that
promotes their survival rate. Thus, their behaviour is more in line with a self-
interested approach.
In a next step specification (7) and in the following ones we explore whether
having a child increases the survival rate of an individual. This is indeed the case.
Having a child increases the probability of surviving by overall more than 20
percentage points. This effect in part explains not only the social norm of children
first, but also the parental investment norm. By having children, parents (especially
mothers) will fight much harder for them to survive. Helping children provides the
possibility of guaranteeing future generations and women had the main function as
caregivers during that time. In specification (8) we again focus on couples only. We
find that passenger class and children also matter. In this specification we observe the
strongest gender effect. This could be explained by the husbands and fathers fighting
stronger for their partners and offsprings to secure a lifeboat seat and then perishing as
they did not obtain a seat themselves.
Specifications (9) to (11) allow us to explore whether being active within a
small or large group increases the probability of survival. Joint efforts may lead to a
higher probability of surviving, but may induce a lower level of flexibility in critical
situations. The results indicate that both coefficients, the one for small groups
(couples) and large groups (families), are negative. Thus, people acting alone have a
higher probability of surviving. There is even a statistically significant difference to
the smaller group.
Finally, we control in the last two specifications in Table 1 for nationality.
First we include a dummy for the single largest group: people from England. We find
that English people have a lower probability of surviving. To deal with the
heterogeneous structure of the reference group in specification (10) we use people
from England as the reference group in specification (11) and compare them with
other nationalities such as the USA, Ireland, Sweden and the remaining countries.
Interestingly, the results show that Americans have ceteris paribus the highest
probability of surviving.
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Next we investigate the survival factors among females. This allows us to test,
for example, whether a higher priority is placed upon females in their reproductive
age. We therefore build three dummy variables, namely age16-35, age below 16 and
age36+. Table 2 presents the results. The findings indeed indicate that women in their
reproductive age are more likely to survive. Compared to the reference group (age
36+) their probability increases by more than 16 percentage points (see specification
12). This result remains robust after including further factors (see other
specifications).
Also here we observe a passenger class effect. Table 2 shows that the class
coefficients report the largest marginal effects. Being a first class passenger increased
the probability of surviving among women by around 40 percentage points.
Interestingly, there is no statistically significant difference between children and the
reference group. One reason could be that several of women above the reproductive
age may be active as caregivers. Specifications (14) to (18) show that having a child
increases ceteris paribus the probability of surviving among women. Interestingly, we
also observe that female crew members have a higher probability of surviving. The
quantitative difference is quite substantial (close to 20 percentage points). On the
other had, being in a small group (only with a partner) reduces the probability of
surviving while being part of a larger group (family) does not lead to a statistically
significant difference in relation to women who are travelling alone. Finally, Table 2
also shows that nationality doesn’t matter. Thus, the advantage of being a US citizen
disappears once you focus only on women.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
There is not much evidence available that explores whether interdependent
preferences and pro-social behaviour matter in extreme situations such as life and
death events. This paper tries to reduce this shortcoming by exploring this question
using data from the sinking of the Titanic. This data set allows us to explore not only
the behavioural consequences in an extreme event, but also provides evidence how
people react in a situation where there is an excess of demand due to the shortage of
lifeboats. Moreover, the explored event can be seen as a quasi-natural experiment.
The environmental or situational conditions were identical for every person on board
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the Titanic. The event can be seen as an external shock that affected all people in the
same manner. In addition, we can largely exclude that potential helping behaviour
could be driven by future reciprocity. Such a life and death situation can be seen as a
“one-shot game”.
The results indicate a strong support that social norms and altruism matters.
The norm “women and children first” is visible in such a life and death situation.
Being female rather than male increases the probability of surviving between 23.7 and
53.9 percentage points, depending on the specification used. This is a large
quantitative effect. Interestingly, females have a lower probability to survive among
crew member than among passengers. However, the effect is still quite substantial
(23.7 percentage points). Moreover, we observe that the survival rate of females
increase when focusing only on couples. Similarly, being a child rather than a person
AGE 51+ (reference group) increases the probability of surviving around 30
percentage points. Comparing the survival probability among women we observe that
having a child and being in the reproductive age has strong and robust impact on the
survival probability. Having a child also increases the probability of surviving when
considering also males. Such results are in line with socio-biology theories (e.g.
procreation instincts or parental investment) that we discussed in the theoretical part.
The findings are also consistent with previous results that report that males are more
willing to help in critical situations (e.g. chivalrous and heroic behaviour).
 We also observe a strong effect of social class. Passengers of the first and
second class have a higher probability of surviving. Preferential treatment, a higher
level (bargaining) power, better access to information about imminent danger, persons
of power and decision makers such as leading crew members may lead to a higher
probability of surviving being able to get a better access to lifeboats. Moreover, they
were closer to the boat deck. Similarly, it seems that crew members used their
information advantage and their better access to resources (e.g. lifeboats) to generate a
higher probability of surviving.
In sum, the intention of the paper was to investigate the decisions made under
these extreme conditions and to see if the survival outcomes fit with the literature on
interdependent preferences and social norms. Helping behaviour is common and
altruism or social and moral norms seem to play a central role in such a risky and
extreme situation. For example, we observe that social norms such as “women and
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children first” are surviving in such external shocks that create life and death
situations. Such an effect is only observable if both, the crew and the passengers
agreed to follow such norms. Otherwise, it would have been very easy for male
passengers to revolt against such a norm.  Actions are guided by norms and rationality
in the sense that the society profits from a large amount of female and offsprings that
survive. The social norms are strong enough to keep the “public good” problem of
helping under control, limiting individual self-interested behaviour, although people
also take advantage of their relative situation as can be seen by the higher survival
rate of crew and first and second class passengers. Our findings clearly show the
importance of working with Richard Thaler’s notion of a Homo Sapiens to be able to
understand individuals’ behaviour in a life and death environment.
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Table 1: Survival Probability and Pro-Social Behaviour.
Probit All Passenger Crew Couple Passenger All All Couples All All All
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1.413*** 1.407*** 1.858*** 1.477*** 1.428*** 1.493*** 1.488*** 1.702*** 1.517*** 1.509*** 1.512***
20.22 17.38 5.50 10.29 16.69 18.29 18.16 9.8 18.11 17.98 17.84
FEMALE
0.517 0.511 0.237 0.539 0.516 0.542 0.541 0.605 0.550 0.547 0.548
0.829*** 0.764*** 0.758*** 0.745*** 0.745*** 0.753***
4.09 3.94 3.89 3.76 3.75 3.77
AGE Sub 15
0.320 0.293 0.291 0.286 0.285 0.289
0.468*** 0.416*** 0.445*** 0.463*** 0.462*** 0.469***
2.95 2.84 3.01 3.11 3.10 3.14
AGE 16 - 50
0.157 0.131 0.139 0.143 0.143 0.145
0.536*** 0.546*** 0.493*** 0.649*** 0.631***
6.51 6.61 5.42 5.62 5.37
CREW
0.189 0.193 0.174 0.229 0.223
1.140*** 1.140*** 1.122*** 0.833*** 1.194*** 1.173*** 1.136***
10.51 10.92 10.68 3.85 10.91 10.67 9.36
1st Class
0.429 0.429 0.422 0.320 0.448 0.440 0.427
0.416*** 0.407*** 0.390*** 1.577*** 0.412*** 0.481 0.454***
3.99 3.9 3.72 7.9 3.89 4.34 3.97
2nd Class
0.157 0.150 0.144 0.569 0.153 0.179 0.169
0.523*** 0.596*** 0.713*** 0.688 0.682***
2.69 2.77 3.39 3.26 3.22
Has Child/
Children
0.199 0.234 0.274 0.264 0.261
Small
Groups
-0.274**
-0.254 -0.252***
(Couples) -2.47 -2.28 -2.25
-0.090 -0.084 -0.084
Large
Groups
-0.479
-0.033 -0.023
(Families) -0.47 -0.33 -0.22
-0.017 -0.012 -0.008
-0.201***
-2.20
England
(1143)
-0.070
0.140
0.85
Ireland (114)
0.050
0.068
0.40
Sweden
(106)
0.024
0.236**
2.18
USA (424)
0.085
All Others
(399) 0.206*
1.89
0.040
Obs. 2186 1258 886 376 1258 2186 2186 376 2186 2186 2186
Prob.>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.161 0.196 0.041 0.221 0.268 0.209 0.212 0.389 0.214 0.216 0.216
Notes: z- values in italics, marginal effects in bold. The symbols *, **, *** represent  statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2: Survival of Women
Probit Passenger All All Couples All All All
 (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
0.147 0.060 0.086 0.993 -0.011 -0.012 0.054
0.61 0.25 0.35 1.15 -0.04 -0.05 0.21
AGE Sub15
0.044 0.017 0.023 0.089 -0.003 -0.003 0.015
0.528*** 0.421** 0.457** 0.272 0.473*** 0.472*** 0.425**
2.85 2.39 2.55 0.83 2.62 2.60 2.29
AGE 16 – 35
0.169 0.125 0.132 0.048 0.135 0.135 0.121
1.177*** 1.22*** 1.007*** 1.014*** 1.031***
3.41 3.54 2.81 2.64 2.66
CREW Dummy
0.200 0.194 0.174 0.175 0.177
1.964*** 2.001*** 1.99*** 2.899*** 2.170*** 2.168*** 2.138***
7.96 8.45 8.21 6.04 8.74 8.69 7.89
1st Class
0.415 0.403 0.389 0.527 0.408 0.407 0.403
1.131*** 1.118*** 1.111*** 1.168*** 1.202*** 1.205*** 1.188***
6.40 6.37 6.25 3.77 6.43 6.11 5.80
2nd Class
0.274 0.241 0.231 0.136 0.240 0.241 0.238
1.024** 1.45*** 1.457*** 1.456*** 1.536***
2.37 2.98 3.18 3.17 3.16
Has Child/Children
0.186 0.154 0.215 0.215 0.220
-0.661*** -0.660*** -0.623***
-3.43 -3.40 -3.18
Small Groups (Couples)
-0.197 -0.196 -0.185
-0.167 -0.166 -0.154
-0.95 -0.94 -0.86
Large Groups (Families)
-0.047 -0.047 -0.044
-0.009
-0.05
England Dummy
-0.003
0.203
0.76
Ireland
0.052
-0.413
-1.40
Sweden
-0.130
0.016
0.07
USA
0.0040
0.045
0.21
All Other Nations
0.012
Obs. 433 482 482 169 482 482 482
Prob.>chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2198 0.2338 0.2466 0.4505 0.2683 0.2683 0.2761
Notes: z- values in italics, marginal effects in bold. The symbols *, **, *** represent  statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A1: Mean Values
Variables Mean
Survived 0.319
FEMALE 0.220
AGE Sub 15 0.052
AGE 16 - 50 0.891
CREW 0.405
1st Class 0.146
2nd Class 0.129
Has Kids 0.031
Small Groups 0.171
(Couples)
Large Groups 0.167
(Families)
England 0.529
Ireland 0.052
Sweden 0.048
USA 0.191
Other Nationalities 0.180
Female Age 16-35 0.589
